Do Poles want further aid to Ukraine? New polls do not lie

No, polls from July and August 2026 clearly show that the majority of Poles oppose the government's policy, preferring the postulates of the opposition and Karol Nawrocki. This shift in social sentiment is the result of a culmination of tensions on the Warsaw-Kyiv line and a growing conviction that Donald Tusk's government has lost control over state priorities. Citizens, looking through the prism of their own economic security and the efficient functioning of public institutions, are increasingly seeking an alternative in the proposals coming from the right side of the political scene.

Nawrocki versus Tusk: a new dynamic of support

Polarization around Eastern policy has ceased to be the domain of pundits, becoming a statistical fact. As early as July 4, 2026, the Kresy.pl service published data indicating that Karol Nawrocki enjoys greater trust than the incumbent cabinet in the context of disputes with the Ukrainian administration. This is not an isolated case, but a symptom of a deeper phenomenon: voters have stopped identifying with Donald Tusk's diplomatic restraint. In the face of reports about a crisis in relations with Kyiv, signaled by Wiadomości Onet on July 3, the public began to strictly evaluate the effectiveness of the current government strategy.

Goniec.pl, in a study from July 12, asked respondents about specific expectations regarding political leaders. The results leave no illusions. Poles expect politicians to prioritize the Polish national interest over unconditional support for a neighbor. Nawrocki, in his speeches, consistently emphasizes the need to introduce control mechanisms regarding humanitarian and military aid, which is increasingly reflected in opinion polls. Tusk, trying to maintain the narrative from March 2026 – when, after his declaration in response to Donald Trump's words, he still seemed to dictate the terms of the debate – is today forced onto the defensive.

A social vote of no confidence in government policy

Donald Tusk is facing an erosion of support that reached a critical point in August. Onet published data on August 9 which, for the cabinet at Aleje Ujazdowskie, is a warning signal of a large scale. The government's rating has fallen to a level that suggests the electorate no longer sees the current coalition as a guarantor of stability. The situation was worsened by events on July 9, when Interia published results regarding the government's resignation in the context of a scandal at one of the public hospitals in Warsaw. This concerns allegations of negligence in the management of the facility, which in public perception became a symbol of the incompetence of the entire state apparatus.

Voices demanding the cabinet's resignation, reinforced by frustration over foreign policy, create a difficult-to-break wall of resentment. Poles are showing less and less patience for administrative errors. In Warsaw, where the hospital scandal echoed the loudest, voters began to directly link local problems with the general political line of the government. This is a feedback loop: errors in domestic management affect credibility in foreign policy. The government tries to explain this as a coincidence, but data from July and August indicate that voters perceive it as a systemic problem.

The political credit of trust that the government received after the elections was exhausted the moment it collided with the real problems of citizens. A lack of decisiveness on the issue of Ukraine and internal image crises have meant that Tusk is no longer perceived as an effective leader. The opposition, especially the circle gathered around Nawrocki, is skillfully exploiting this moment, pointing out every communication error of the government. Voters no longer want assurances of unity within the coalition. They want to see concrete actions in areas that directly affect their lives – from the availability of medical services to transparency in relations with foreign partners.

Why do Poles support PiS proposals?

The August Onet poll from August 12, 2026, brought an answer that the ruling camp probably wanted to avoid. The majority of respondents supported the proposals of Law and Justice (PiS) regarding the limitation of aid to citizens of Ukraine. This postulate, previously treated by mainstream media as radical, has become the main point of reference for voters. Why did this happen? Primarily because PiS translated its postulates into a clear message: "the Polish citizen first."

Support for these proposals does not stem from a sudden surge of resentment toward neighbors, but from a feeling that state resources are being managed irresponsibly. Nawrocki and PiS politicians consistently raise the issues of auditing aid and introducing hard limits, which met with the approval of the majority of those surveyed in the August 12 study. Tusk, sticking to his current line, has found himself in a political trap. Every attempt to toughen the course is perceived as a delayed reaction to opposition pressure, and the continuation of current policy deepens the distance between the government and society.

The opposition has effectively diagnosed material fatigue. While the government tries to maintain continuity of action, voters in polls are giving a clear signal: they expect priority treatment for the interests of their own country. This is not a temporary rebellion, but a lasting trend that forces those in power onto the defensive. Tusk is losing ground because his narrative of unconditional support is ceasing to find understanding with the average Pole. PiS, by taking the initiative in this debate, hits the core of growing social frustration, offering simple and concrete solutions that for many have become the only rational alternative.

Government strategy under time pressure

Donald Tusk's cabinet is drifting in the second half of 2026 without a clear strategy. This is confirmed not only by Ukrainian issues but also by constitutional disputes. The "Do Rzeczy" poll from August 27, 2026, regarding the government's ideas on the Constitutional Tribunal – including the controversial concept of changes in proceedings, referred to in public debate as "tag in the CT" – shows that even in matters of an institutional nature, Poles are against the government. This aversion to constitutional changes translates directly into the perception of foreign policy.

Voters see a coherent image of a government that cannot either come to an agreement with the opposition on key state matters or effectively manage relations with foreign countries. In March 2026, after Tusk's declaration to Donald Trump, many observers believed that the government had gained room for maneuver. Today it is clearly visible that that credit of trust has been largely consumed. Data from July and August are brutal: society does not want a further, unconditional model of aid. It wants a revision of priorities.

For the ruling camp, this is an alarm signal that was ignored at a key moment. Tusk can no longer effectively communicate his vision because that vision is contrary to the expectations of the majority. Every subsequent month brings new data that confirms this trend. If the government does not make a radical correction of its course – not only on the issue of aid to Ukraine but also in the way of exercising power in the country – the distance between it and society will only deepen. In 2026, voters are showing that they expect from politicians not so much diplomacy as effectiveness in taking care of daily security and the interests of the state, and in this competition, the Tusk government is currently losing.

What this means for you

Editorial angle: The Tusk government has found itself in a trap of its own declarations and lack of flexibility. Opposition politicians (Nawrocki, PiS) are gaining from this, as they accurately read social moods. The catch: further ignoring public opinion on matters as important as Eastern policy or the functioning of state institutions may lead to a permanent loss of support and a deep political crisis in 2026, from which the government may not emerge unscathed before the next elections.

Questions and answers

Do Poles still want to help Ukraine as they have until now?

Polls from August 2026 show that the majority of Poles support proposals to limit aid, distancing themselves from the current government line, which is based on unconditional support.

Who is gaining from the dispute over Ukraine?

Research (including Kresy.pl from July 2026) shows that it is Karol Nawrocki who enjoys greater social trust in this dispute than the current government, which results from his adoption of a narrative more focused on the national interest.

What are the main reasons for dissatisfaction with the government?

In addition to Ukrainian issues, the decline in support is influenced by internal scandals, including the scandal at a Warsaw hospital from July 2026, which in the eyes of voters became a symbol of the government's administrative incompetence, as well as opposition to plans for changes in the functioning of the Constitutional Tribunal.